


faces of PALESTINE

Has the establishment media been objective and fair in its treatment of the Middle East conflict? Several people on campus—of Arab, Jewish and other background—have been compiling and writing material from the Palestinian viewpoint.

It becomes clear upon reading that much of the analysis and interpretation presented here are glossed over or even totally ignored by the Press and T.V.

Palestinians are the people who, up to 1948, lived in what is now called "Israel". Until 1948 Palestine was under British mandate. The Zionist settlers started immigrating to Palestine at the beginning of this century, and particularly after World War I. With the formation of the "State of Israel" in 1948, many Palestinians were driven out. During the 1967 war, more territories were annexed and more Palestinian became refugees.

The following articles examine some of the historical, cultural, and political aspects of the situation.



PALESTINIAN ARE YOUR EYES, YOUR TATTOO
PALESTINIAN IS YOUR NAME,
PALESTINIAN YOUR THOUGHT, YOUR CLOTHES
YOUR FEET, YOUR FORM,
PALESTINIAN THE WORDS,
PALESTINIAN THE VOICE,
PALESTINIAN YOU LIVE,
PALESTINIAN YOU WILL DIE,

The graphics are the work of Mr. Kamal Boullata.

The Middle East: An Arab Point of View

Nabil Abourisha

In the following paragraphs, I will try to present an Arab view of the Middle East situation. Such a view is seldom, if ever, adopted by the local news media, who are in general very strongly pro-Israel.

In this view, I will insist on distinguishing between the two major components of the conflict, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These are not independent, of course, but viewing them as two entities will give a better indication of the alignment of the present forces.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be understood as a clash between two nationalisms, and as a struggle between coloniser and colonised. Here is what P. Sweezy and H. Magdoff, editors of the Monthly Review, have to say about it: (M.R., Vol. 22, No. 3)

"Palestinian nationalism emerged not only on the general foundations of an Arab nationalism in conflict with a foreign enclave in the form of the Israeli state, but also on the specific experience of recently lost lands, homes, and means of livelihood. Professor Peretz summarizes the initial losses as follows:

As a result of Arab defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war some 350 new Jewish settlements out of the first 370 established after 1948 were on former Arab property. Whole Arab cities—such as Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramle, Baysan, and Majdal—388 towns and villages, and large parts of others, containing nearly a quarter of all buildings standing in Israel during 1948, were taken over by new Jewish immigrants. Ten thousand former Arab shops, businesses, and stores were left in Jewish hands as well as some 30,000 acres of groves that supplied at least a quarter of the new state's scarce foreign currency earnings from citrus. Acquisition of this former Palestine Arab property helped greatly to make the Jewish state economically viable and to speed up the early influx of refugees and immigrants from Europe."

The intentions of the Zionist settlers were clear long before 1948; while the Balfour Declaration mentions that the "Civic and Religious" rights of the native population should be preserved, it carefully avoids mentioning their political rights.

The other Arab peoples were very much affected by the Palestinian Tragedy. For despite all the differences that exist among Arab governments, there is a strong sense of solidarity among the Arab people. They share the same history, the same culture, and most of them have the same religion. Therefore, the Arab governments were forced by public opinion—and against their will—to embrace the Palestinian cause. For if they hadn't, their political opponents would certainly have used this excuse to defeat them.

Thus, the Arab governments "support" the Palestinians, but not at all whole-heartedly. In addition

to the practical difficulties arising out of a direct confrontation with Israel, the Palestinians present another problem for the Arab governments: being progressive, their revolutionary organization forms a threat to the old regimes by being a "bad example".

But there is another reason for general Arab concern, from both the government and the people. The leaders of the Zionist movement depended very much on Western powers. They received much support from them, and on top of their strong cultural ties with Europe and North America, they developed strong economic ties as well. (According to Paul Sweezy, loans, contributions and donations from the Western countries to Israel makes up more than \$125 of the Israeli annual per capita income. This is more than the total annual per capita income of many of the Arab countries. [Monthly Review, Vol. 19, No. 5]. Moreover, Israel's ties with South Africa, in cutting and marketing the diamonds produced there, was another factor that identified the Israeli occupant once more with the colonial powers against which the Arabs had been struggling for so many years. Israel could also intervene in case the American Oil Industry in the area was threatened. (And in fact it did intervene in the Suez war, in 1956, hoping to seize the opportunity to occupy Sinai.)

Hence, Israel could justifiably be called—in Leftist terminology—a "lackey of imperialism". Although I disagree with those who consider Israel simply as a "lackey of imperialism", and ignore the impetus of Jewish nationalism, I must admit that Israel's dependence on Western protection, and the services that Israel gives back to the West as a "fee" for this protection, are enormous. Most Arabs are quite resentful of this.

As for Jewish nationalism, neither does it justify the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian population. The intentions of Europeans anti-Semites were attributed—without justification—to the Arabs. As a result, the Zionist settlers were all the more aggressive in subjugating the Palestinians. It would seem that Golda Meir's policy of "retaliation in advance" was started by her predecessors more than 50 years ago.... even before the Palestinians could identify the Zionist settlers as "enemies"!

The conclusion which follows from all this is that, since the beginning of this century, the Arabs have been in a defensive position with respect to the Zionist settlers and later to the State of Israel. However, for the Western mind, this statement might seem to be in contradiction with the belligerent statements some Arabic newspapers (all of which are government-sponsored) have printed. A closer look at

the local situation in the Arab countries indicates that this is not the case. First of all, any translator knows that translating a sentence literally, word by word, can lead to nonsense—which is clearly recognizable—or to something worse than nonsense—distortion or even falsification of the intended meaning. The meaning of a word or a sentence depends on the context. The Arab-speaking newspaper addresses itself to the Arab population, and this population feels the events in a different way and expresses this feeling differently. Second, the "man on the street" there can hardly be expected to believe that his government is trying to oppose Israeli expansionist policy (peacefully or otherwise) if that government does not at least make harsh statements towards Israel. Third, the natural tendency there is to exaggerate the expression of any feeling. Even a superficial look at Arab poetry, with its extensive use of hyperbole, will confirm this particularity of Arab verbal expression.

But there is a more important reason for such belligerent statements. This is the rivalry between the different Arab governments, and their ambitions to become the leader of the Arab world. Since the main problem for Arabs is Israel's aggressiveness, the Government who answers back with the harshest words (being unable—or unwilling—to take any effective action) will be the one who—in a sense—best compensates for their humiliation. Such tones, although necessary in the actual situation, have serious disadvantages. In addition to giving Israel a good excuse to promote its expansionist policies, they undoubtedly mislead some people, both in and out of the Arab world.

Fortunately, the Palestinians themselves never adopted such tones. They make clear that what they want to destroy are the structures of the state of Israel, never the people. In their publications, the main "principle" is the one shown in the poster below.

One has to recognize that the Palestinians, expatriated for almost 25 years, have shown a great restraint by always struggling against an ideology, not against a people. Israel's failure to understand this might lead to a point of no-return, as witnessed by the recent bitter attacks of some Palestinian extremists. Ignored by many, misunderstood or used as political tools by others, the Palestinians are getting desperate.

It is not my purpose to speculate about the future. But I think that any concerned person should give some attention to this problem, and try to gather a "balanced" opinion about it (what would "objective" mean, in this context?), rather than a one-sided view. I am glad to see that at least a tiny minority of persons of Jewish religion are strongly opposing Israel's ideology. As desperate as the situation is, it is perhaps still possible to see the day where "...Christian, Moslem and Jew worship, work, and enjoy equal rights" in the Holy Land.

Treatment of Arabs in Israel

Tewfic Abouwarda

Much has been written about the treatment of Jewish communities in places such as the U.S.S.R., but few readers know about the treatment of the Arab community in Israel. This article attempts to take a brief, but factual, look at this tragic problem.

As is well known, there were two wars in which the Palestinian Arabs were involved. After the war of 1948 between the Arabs and Israel, about 200,000 came under the direct jurisdiction of the newly-declared "State of Israel". To this number must be added the more than one million Palestinian Arabs who came under Israeli rule following the June war of 1967.

How are these Arabs treated in Israel? It will be useful to begin by examining the history of the "Defence Laws".

During the British mandate of Palestine, which preceded the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, the British government had instituted the so-called British Government Defence Laws; and these laws were strongly opposed by the Jewish settlers. The defence laws gave the British authorities the right to banish members of organizations, send the leaders to prison, search for arms in colonies, and impose curfews in the towns without warning. As Dr. Dunkelbaum, who was to become an Israeli Supreme Court judge, put it, the laws "contradicted the most fundamental principles of law, justice and jurisprudence". At the end of World War II, these laws were directed against both the Arab population and the Jewish population, especially against Jewish terrorist organizations such as ETZEL and LEHI (the former of which was responsible under the mandate for large-scale attacks with explosives on Arab market-places and government departments and, during the Palestine War of 1948, for many atrocities, including the massacre of Deir Yassin in which 254 Arab civilians were cold-bloodedly murdered and their bodies dumped into a well.)

Sabri Jiryis, a Palestinian Arab lawyer and, technically, an Israeli citizen, writes in his book *The Arabs in Israel*: "The laws were violently opposed by Jewish settlers in Palestine in various ways". Conferences of Jewish lawyers were held to demand the abolition of the defence laws. Jiryis continues: "When the State of Israel was established, one of its first steps should have been the repeal of these oppressive and imperialist laws. In fact, the laws not only remained on the Statute Books, but they were employed by the new regime to the same extent as under its predecessor. It is as if nothing had changed. The leaders of the new regime changed their coats overnight. They forgot the battle they themselves had waged against the defence laws, and shamelessly went on to enforce them as rigorously as possible." (Emphasis added).

A second law to be passed by the Israeli government was the Law on the Acquisition of Absentees' Property of 1950, which first appeared in the form of emergency articles dealing with absentees' property

laid down by the Minister of Finance on December 12, 1948. This law, and the amende articles, defined the legal status of the property of "absentees" who had left the country. Under this law, their property was transferred to the "Custodian of Absentees' Property" who was appointed by the provisions of the law. A vast number of Arab landowners were deprived of their property by means of this law, and made refugees in the literal sense of the word. The first paragraph of the law includes the following definition of the word "absentee":

....(B) The word 'absentee' shall mean the following: 1. Any person who was a citizen of the Land of Israel, and left his ordinary place of residence in the Land of Israel at any time between 29 November 1948 and the day on which it is announced that the State of Emergency declared by the Provisional Council of State, is abrogated, shall be regarded as an 'absentee' if he left the country (during the above period) to: (A) a place outside the Land of Israel before 1 September 1948, or (B) a place inside the Land of Israel at that time occupied by forces that wished to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or fought against it after its establishment."

In other words, if an Arab left his usual place of living even to visit a neighbouring country (in itself a perfectly legal thing to do), or to visit any place in Palestine not under Israeli rule during the above-mentioned period, he is considered an "absentee" even in present in Israel - even if he is a citizen and has voting rights. The enforcement of this law has been carried out extremely harshly, and Jiryis is by no means exaggerating when he calls it "one of the cruellest of all expatriation laws" and says that "It is extremely difficult to explain this arbitrary and illogical article except as the result of an insatiable greed for Arab lands."


A third example of the treatment of Arabs in Israel is Collective Punishment which, especially since the Six Day War, has had a widespread application in Israel.

In 1950, the Israeli authorities promulgated "The Law of the Return". This was followed in 1952 by "The Nationality Law". Sami Hadami, in his book *Israel and the Arab Minority*, describes the consequence of these measures: "Under these two laws, the right of entry into Israel is automatically and unconditionally conferred upon a Jew of whatever nationality the moment he steps onto Israeli soil. The Moslem and Christian Arabs, on the other hand, are not so privileged even within their own country. The fact that the Palestine Arab was born in the territory now under Israeli control is insufficient to confer upon him automatic citizenship."

Moreover, Arabs - especially Arab students who came under Israeli rule following the Six Day War - who leave Israel on Israeli "Laissez-passer" to study in Europe or America, are required to apply for a "visitor's" visa if they want to visit their families in the occupied territories during the summer vacation, an action which takes almost six weeks to complete.

This description of the injustices inflicted by the Israelis upon Arabs in Israel is not exhaustive; it merely scratches the surface. An awareness of these injustices is one step towards achieving a balanced view of the present situation in the Middle East.

PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE



GOES ON

WE ARE FIGHTING TODAY TO CREATE THE NEW PALESTINE OF TOMORROW. A UNIFIED & DEMOCRATIC, NONSECTARIAN PALESTINE IN WHICH CHRISTIAN, MOSLEM & JEW WORSHIP, WORK & ENJOY EQUAL RIGHTS. THIS IS NO UTOPIAN DREAM OR FALSE PROMISE, FOR THE PALESTINIANS HAVE ALWAYS LIVED IN PEACE, MOSLEMS, CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE HOLY LAND

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Rachad Antonius

resistance to Israeli occupation". Edited by Naseer Aruri.) "Although changes in productivity did not occur overnight, the response was evident sooner than could have been expected."

"By changes I do not mean painting a commando instead of a refugee (...) The real change has been more radical: the Arab artist, and especially the Palestinian artist in exile, has had to re-evaluate his very place in society. Means of expression took on a new purpose and their languages were exchanged. Some poets exchanged their typewriters for machine guns; other abandoned poetry to write novels and those who formerly wrote love poems turned to social and political themes. The experimental movie-maker became the mere photographer of events for documentary purposes. A professional painter became a graphic artist, an illustrator, or a social worker. The painter who used to be seen through the window of his studio was no longer there because he descended to the street. Posters hang everywhere, but no one knows their creators. Verses of poetry appear on posters but the name of the poet remains anonymous. The paintings formerly hanging in Beirut galleries are now reduced to the size of a greeting card or a poster to be sold by the hundreds for the benefit of those who suffered through the war. An artist designed colorful sticker stamps for Fatah and another designed a most powerful graphic design for the Popular Front which later became a trade mark. Abed Abidi, now in Dresden, has quit studio painting and is studying the art of murals. The galleries of Beirut are becoming a body without a soul for the soul was set free in the streets and in the camps."

"A people's art is born, not as a result of a watchful revolutionary censorship, as Trotsky envisioned in the formation of a socially aware art, but because a talented people, given their particular circumstances, didn't know better."



About Palestinian Art

The events of the past 25 years have been a traumatic experience for every Palestinian. How has the Palestinian artist reacted to this trauma?

The years 1948 and 1967 were turning points for Palestinian art, and in particular for studio art. Before 1948, poetry was still very traditional and individualistic, while graphic arts were restricted to icon painting and carpet painting.

After 1948, the Palestinian people felt its identity threatened. The need to express oneself arose, and art emerged spontaneously. Amateurs started to paint and to write. Few of them had professional training. Among the artists, one finds the blacksmith, the carpenter, the gardener and the schoolteacher. The style - in studio art - was influenced by European art, but the content was essentially arabic: reviving old folk tales, Islamic design, arabesques, etc... Apparently individualistic and uncommitted, this art had a vital function: it gave life to the common heritage of all Palestinians; it told the Palestinian in Gaza as well as those in the West bank that they had a common past - a common present, and that they couldn't escape having a common future. Some of the painters expressed explicitly their troubled present: a barbed wire separating the same people, refugees trying to survive - physically and morally - through the events. As for poetry, Emile Nakhleh writes "The impact of the tragedy has created a new breed of Palestinian poets whose main literary works are focused on the return to Palestine. Regaining the fatherland, "watan", has become an article of faith." As for the poets of the Arab minority in Israel he says; "Israeli-Arab poetry graphically depicts the discrimination against, and the mistreatment of the Arab minority in Israel."

The 1967 war had an even greater effect. "The impact of the 1967 war on Arab intellectuals in general and on visual artists in particular was profound," says Kamal Boullata. (In: "The Palestinian

Zionism and the West

Alan Rosenthal

Introduction:

The influence of Zionist ideology in the Western media, especially in their coverage of the Palestinian and Arab-Israeli struggles, has been crucial in creating a false consciousness concerning the Middle East on the part of many North Americans. Such propaganda has been an indispensable tool of the Israeli regime in ensuring continued flow of funds (both public and private), in particular from the U.S. When we realize that, even before the 1967 war, Israel was receiving as much as \$250 million in direct grants and aid from western countries alone (Source: Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew*, p. 129) and that this massive influx of foreign currency has helped to create a largely artificial trade and economic situation, and a standard of living wholly unwarranted by the volume of productive output, it is easy to understand the importance of such a campaign.

The distortion of events and trends in the Western press takes various forms:

1. Factual distortion:

—Zionism is presented as a progressive nationalist movement which has ensured the salvation of a persecuted people, turned deserts green, brought enlightened culture to a primitive wasteland, and so forth. As opposed to this, Arab and Palestinian nationalisms are depicted as fanatical religious movements foisted by demagogic and self-seeking individuals. Usually the existence and national identity of the Palestinian people are denied.

—Numbers of refugees are almost universally under-estimated.

—Israel is usually described as just barely holding its own in the "arms race" against supposedly overwhelming Arab odds.

2. Errors of omission:

—Israel is misrepresented as being a united and homogeneous society, with a democratic socialist economy. No mention is made of: (a) class struggle; (b) supremacy of European Jews, imposed upon native Middle Eastern and North African Jews who actually constitute a majority of the population; (c) economic, political and military suppression of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants.

—Lack of any reference to the victories won by the Palestinian liberation forces.

—No analysis is given of Israel's role as defender of U.S. imperialist interests in the region, both protecting oil interests, and servicing to prop up reactionary Arab regimes in neighbouring countries. The U.S. thus uses Israel to keep Arabs from unity of action, and to limit Soviet influence in the area.

3. Distortion by slur and innuendo:

—As late as July 1967, the editor of *Ramparts* was able to publish an article on "Arab refugees" without once identifying them as Palestinians. (*Ramparts*, July 1967, pp. 2-3).

—In the same article, Arab-Israeli conflicts are ascribed partly to ancient "tribal hatreds", thus ignoring the centuries - long peaceful co-existence of native Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and covering up the real socio-economic roots of the struggle.

—Refugees are often called "guerillas", and guerillas and PLO fighters are called "terrorists" (as during Israeli invasions of Lebanon and Syria, and during Hussein's U.S. - sponsored massacre of Palestinian refugees).

—A recent Reuters dispatch describes a "policy split" in the Meir cabinet concerning the disposition of the "occupied territories": the "hardliners" favour immediate and permanent colonization, while the so-called "moderates" fear that this might lead to eventual equality of numbers of Jews and Arabs, thus threatening the integrity of the "Jewish State". Thus, outright racist policies are labelled "moderate"!

—The front page of the Nov. 10 issue of "Forward" (a Yiddish - language daily from New York) carries a headline reading: "Sadat says war with Israel is inevitable". Only a careful reading - between-the-lines of the article reveals Sadat's actual meaning: since the Zionists are demonstrating their intention not to return the occupied territories, they will have to be restored by force of arms.

—The Oct. 25 issue of the (N.Y.) *Guardian* quotes the (ironically named) Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as saying that the Munich incident is another example of the long-standing "Arab tradition of extremism and violence".

mosaic

Here is a statistical table which draws a comparison between total Jewish emigration before and after the Balfour Declaration and emigration to Palestine.

Administration Period	Total Jewish Emigration	Emigration to Palestine	Proportion of Emigration to Palestine
Turkish 1881-1917	3,177,000	60,000	1.9%
British 1919-14/5/48	1,751,000	487,000	27.6%
Israeli 15/5/48-52	911,000	711,000	78%

As it is well known, the creation of Israel in Palestine had as a primary consequence the sending of Palestinian Arabs to live inhumanely in refugee camps. Here are some statistical figures:

The total number of refugees registered by UNRWA on 31 May 1967 was 1,344,576. They were distributed as follows: 722,687 in Jordan, 316,776 in Gaza, 160,723 in Lebanon, and 144,390 in Syria. The Six Day War increased the number of refugees to about two million. (Source: Gerard Chaliand, *The Palestinian Resistance*; (p.29) Original source: United Nations.)

(3) Ever since the Six Day War and Israeli occupation of Arab territories, collective punishment was a principle of wide application. Among the many collective punishments perpetrated are taking hostages, expulsion of Palestinian leaders and notables, curfews, etc. However, the most dramatic and drastic of all is the blowing-up of homes as a result of unsubstantiated rumors that a member of a family has some connection with the guerrilla movement. This table shows the widespread practice of demolishing homes:

Location	Number of homes blown up at various periods.		
	June 1967 - April 1968	April 1968 - Sept. 1969	Sept. 1969 - Nov. 1969
Jerusalem	145	290	342
Latrun	1830	2500	2500
Samaria	2635	3703	3719
Hebron	399	427	519
Gaza	280	322	352
Ramalla & surrounding villages	33	—	—
Bethlehem & surrounding villages & refugee camps	45	36	44
TOTAL	5367	7355	7554

Source: Booklet published by the League of Arab States in London reproducing a publication of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights.

Items:

There are widespread misconceptions concerning the nature of the Palestinian liberation movement so far as the Western reader is concerned. Fatah, the largest group in the Palestinian resistance movement, in its first communiqué to the world press in 1968, stated, "The Palestine problem is essentially the problem of an entire people, the Arabs of Palestine, uprooted and expelled from their homeland in order to permit the establishment of Israel. Fatah wishes to point out, however, that its operations — which today enjoy the support of the entire Palestinian people — are in no way aimed at the Jewish people as such with whom they lived in harmony in the past for many centuries. Nor does it intend to 'push the Jews into the sea.' The Palestinians' challenge is directed at Israel's ideology of exclusiveness, which insists on a particular ethnic - religious identity for normal participation in its society. "Fatah also wishes to correct once and for all the Zionist insinuation that this "terrorist" movement is inspired and directed from the outside by such countries as Syria, Jordan, Algeria, or Egypt." The Palestinian Revolution seeks to create a new, secular order and the vision of the future is that of the day when "the flag of Palestine is hoisted over their freed, democratic, peaceful land, a new era will begin in which the Palestinian Jews will again live in harmony side by side with the original owners of the land, the Arab Palestinians."

"IDENTITY CARD"

Write down, I am an Arab!
Fifty thousand is my number,
Eight children, the ninth will come
next summer.

Angry? Write down, I am an Arab!

I work with my comrades
in a quarry,
Bread, clothes, and notebooks I earn
for my eight from the rock.
I beg no alms at your door,
Nor do I feel small before you.
Angry? Write down, I am an Arab!

You stole the vineyards of my parents,
The lands I used to plough,
And left us nothing but these rocks —
Will your government take them too,
as has been said?

Then write at the top of the page —
I hate none, attack none, but
When I hunger I'll eat the flesh of
my exploiter.
Beware of my hunger,
Beware of my anger.

Mahmud Darw



Who Started the 1967 War?

To the reader of Middle Eastern affairs, it is always disputed as to who started the 1967 war, whether it was Egypt by closing the Straits of Tiran or Israel by striking first. Here is a remark which may help the reader to judge for himself. In an interview granted to the *New Left Review* on June 23, 1967, Isaac Deutscher mentioned, among other things, the following: "The Arab behavior, especially Nasser's divided mind and hesitation on the eve of the hostilities, presents a striking contrast to Israel's determination and uninhibited aggressiveness. Having with Soviet encouragement, moved his troops to the Sinai frontier, and even put his Russian-made missile in position, Nasser then, without consulting Moscow proclaimed the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. This was a provocative move, though practically of very limited significance. It provided Nasser with a prestige gain and enabled him to claim that he had wrested from Israel the last fruit of their 1956 victory. The Israelis played up the blockade as a mortal danger to their economy, which it was not, and they replied by mobilizing their forces and moving them to the frontiers and consequently striking."

THE PALESTINIANS •

The rise of a state within States

In 1969 two million Palestinian refugees scattered in refugee camps (1.5 million), and in cities of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan suddenly coalesced into a single community. From the refugee camps they evicted the administrative structures of UNRA and the army units and police of the countries in which the camps were located. Branches of the "Palestinian Liberation Organization" were set up in major cities. In the camps they took over administration, health and medical services (adding some where none had existed before), and education, as well as maintaining social order. They sought to exercise informal taxation upon all the Palestinians in the Middle East. They established their own military units outside the camps. They became effectively the "Palestinian State" within the states of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. In spite of repeated attempts to smash the Palestinian organization, it remains effective today and its main activity and locus is still, as the governing system of all Palestinians, chiefly in the camps. The PLO is not merely a guerrilla organization. Sporadic campaigns of the guerrillas into the land they once occupied for two thousand years and which is now held by the Israeli state are only a part of PLO activity.

From the point of view of an anthropologist this is a most interesting and unusual event. It reminds one of the sudden rise of the Metis nation under Louis Riel in the 19th century here in Canada, or of the sudden reorganization of dislocated Arabs and Berbers in French Algeria into an Algerian Algeria. How did it happen? In order to understand the process we should look at history in the Near East as directly as possible, and not from some point of view that reflects the goals of a "great power."


In 1920, virtually the whole governing structure and especially the personnel of the Ottoman Empire was excised from the Levant (Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria). This left peasants, tribal nomadic pastoralists, town and urban craftsmen of many ethnic identities (Greek, Armenian, Jewish, Egyptian, Kurdish, Circassian, Muslim and Christian Arab...) in such political disintegration that indigenous reintegration has been and still is effectively inhibited by external threats and pressures. This is the present situation in the Levant. With the partial exception of Egypt, long under severe economic and population pressures, and the explicit exception of Israel, there is no country in the classical Near East (the Fertile Crescent) that possesses the fully operational institutions of a modern industrial nation-state. In this scene the easy and unscrupulous alliance of some old urban elites to the West is well known by residents in the Levant countries, even though we westerners do not hear much of it. Meanwhile the anthropologist sees such distinctive religious and ethnic groups as Druzes, Alawites, Shi'ite Muslims, Sunni Muslims, Maronites and Armenians standing out as units of power in themselves or as supporting others more powerful.

Repeated resistance and rebellion in city and countryside, notably in the 1930's, was the response of these pre- and sub-Ottoman enclaves to the Mandate Period (1920-1945) of French and British semi-colonial control. But even the Mandate's impositions of parliamentary forms or monarchial trappings scarcely concealed the perpetuation of divisive fragmentation: the rural "tribalism", the mercantile familialism of towns, and socially or territorially enclaved confessionalism. In short, the Ottoman millets and subsidized border tribes of nomadic pastoralists, which the Turks had left behind, continued as dependent clients of Europe and, ultimately, the United States.

In the course of the consolidation of the state of Israel from 1947 to the present, indigenous people (Arabs, Levantine Greeks, Armenians, etc.) have been either forcibly incorporated or, as has been the case with the majority, pressed out of Israeli territory. Most of these latter have been peasants dispossessed of their lands. Their only sanctuaries were the camps where they have been supported at minimum subsistence (30 cents a day) by United Nations agencies. Hostile backlash responses by surrounding countries such as Egypt to expansionist moves by Israel have peaked several times, in 1956, 1967, and 1970. But in studying the continuous friction expressed in raid and counter-raid over Israel's expanding boundaries we should separate the Palestinian actions from those of the army units of surrounding countries. It must still be emphasized, however, that, regardless of the

intensive propaganda from all vested interests in the area and emanating from both Levantine and Western capitals, the indigenous peoples from Iraq west to the Tunisian border had no effect autonomous national political structures until the Egyptian "revolution" of 1952, and the Syrian and Iraqi revolutions of 1958—possibly not even until 1970. None but Egypt was capable of containing internal discontent rising under increasing economic disruption except by force. Much less were these peoples capable of engaging in expansionist or dominating war, and the educated younger generations know it.

If one wishes to understand the nature of "Arab" aggressive activity in response to the colonialization in the Levant of a European-styled, dynamic, and industrial nation-state—small and intensively organized, externally subsidized economically, and demographically and confessionally dominated by one religious community—one must look to the old "Arab" peasant villages and towns. Here one finds merchant and craftsmen families, the religious millets of the Ottoman Empire, the ethnic quarters, the Western-subsidized and favored "elites", the "aristocrats" of the Hedjaz enthroned with their "tribal" bodyguards by the British Mandate—all fragments from a pre-industrial empire. They have been kept in fragmentation to this very day in 1972.



If one looks down into the most intimate domestic circles among these fragments, even the child (boy or girl) is traditionally enculturated to "despise" and "ignore" those outside his ethnic or religious fragment, but to conduct himself with courtesy and hospitality toward them, in reticence, and with a readiness for patron-client alliance with that fragment or external power which is most powerful and friendly.

In 1969-1970, however, a specific organizational and integrating capacity not previously encountered emerged explosively out of the Palestinian refugee sector of the Gaza strip, held by Israel. The Palestinian refugee camps dispersed within the other territorial entities of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon were brought under internal control by Palestinian refugees themselves, members of the P.L.O. (Palestine Liberation Organization). United Nations (UNRA) officials and Lebanese and other "authorities" were suddenly excluded from their previous powers and functions in the camps, and the Palestinian organization took over to create what has been described as a state within states. If, however, a

Palestinian resistance and national movement has been successfully mounted, the organizational principle is still by no means clear apart from a segmentary and factional character of the ten or more allied "parties" each of which has offices in nearly every camp whether Muslim, Christian or mixed. Most vulnerable of all, the economic organization is not self-sufficient and is weakly supported from a multiplicity of Middle Eastern sources, such as a few of the "oil states".

The late summer of 1970 saw an unsurprising internecine battle between the Western-trained and army bodyguard-army of the "royal" Hashemite regime controlling the remnants of Jordanian territory and the Palestinians' armed units from the camps near the city of Amman. In the course of the fighting Palestinian women, children and other non-combatants were killed in a fashion regarded as "massacre". Subsequent events were interpreted as a military move to crush the emergent Palestinian organization by genocidal force, in which the Jordanian "army" was said to be supplied and instigated by external powers, namely Israel and the United States.

The whole scene of rapid organization (1967-1969) into a political movement culminating in this violence can best be understood as a response to the severe stress conditions of overcrowding displaced peoples numbering finally nearly two million—most of these in regions virtually without food and other resources, except by import. Coupled with a new integrative mechanism emerging in the previously less well organized camps, the threat challenged the incumbent regime in Jordan. These battles of the many kinds of Arabs and other segments of the Levantine people are not primarily with Israel at all, for Israel is the most powerful and economically well-off state in the Levant. They are still primarily in conflict with each other, all propaganda notwithstanding. The feuding is lethal because the feuders are well armed, but the verbal displays and funeral ceremonies for fallen "martyrs" far outrun the real scale of war and destruction among themselves or wrought in small-scale guerrilla forays into Israel, to which, in fact, they may have been incited by external agencies. The greatest de facto destruction has been of Arab houses, villages, orchards and crops, and people by Israeli "retaliations" and expansion moves. Many of the recent victims are not even Palestinian.

Traditional and ritualized Arab displays of "fierceness", of loud threat and counter-threat, of running conflict with much shooting in the air, of destruction of property rather than life, and of chivalry toward women and children except in extreme, suggest that Arab conflict rituals in the Levant have not yet entirely given way to chaotic violence under stress. Nor have they escalated fully into the systematic military strategies employed by the armies of industrial states such as, in this area, Israel. A political organization and a resistance movement based in a peasantry forced off their lands lies at the heart of this emergence from the crowded Palestinian refugee camps. Their social threshold for accepting stress without change was crossed in the "war" of 1967 and within two years they adapted their traditional segmentary modes of organization to their needs and assumed aggressive actions and goals previously unknown to them. Like peasants everywhere, they seek justice.

Much publicity has been given to the commando training of recruits from the camps, including young boys and girls. Little attention has been given to a major agent of stress which contributed to the rise of the P.L.O., the mercenary bodyguard of the Jordanian regime—which is far more sophisticated and deadly. And a still less accurate assessment has been given to the "overkill" actions of Israeli military moves, which in fact have less to do with Palestinians than with further infiltrating, destroying and forcing the evacuation of Syrian and Lebanese terrain and villages occupied in these days, by Shi'ite Muslim peasants, Christian Arab peasants and townsmen, and Druze villagers. Once again the Palestinians are being overrun, but now new refugees are created. You will find them in the refugee bidonvilles of Beirut and Damascus. Even a few are in Canada.

Louise E. Sweet

(Adapted from part of a chapter, "Culture and Aggressive Action," in C. M. Otten, *Aggression and Evolution*, pp. 325-344. Toronto: Xerox Publishing Company 1973) An extensive bibliography accompanies this article and documents the interpretation offered here.

As long as I own a foot of land,
As long as I own an olive tree,
A lemon tree, a well, and a memory,
As long as Arabic is still spoken
In folklore and poetry,
I'll wage in the face of my enemies,
On behalf of the free: workers,
students, and poets,
A scourging war against the enemies
of the sun.

Samih Qasim